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The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation 
Gerald F. Davis† 
During the five decades after Berle and Means published The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property in 1932,1 their analysis became 
the dominant understanding of the American corporation. Social scien-
tists, policymakers, and the broader interested public knew about the se-
paration of ownership and control, the potentially fraught relations be-
tween shareholders and managers, and the image of the corporation as a 
social institution. Berle and Means’s view of an economy dominated by a 
handful of ever-larger corporations run by an unaccountable managerial 
class inspired scholarship from sociologists (who were convinced they 
were right) to financial economists (who wanted to prove them wrong) to 
lawyers (who contemplated the rights and obligations implied by this 
system). 
A decade into the twenty-first century, however, the public corpora-
tion may have reached its twilight in the United States. The “shareholder 
value” movement of the past generation has succeeded in turning manag-
ers into faithful servants of share price maximization, even when this 
comes at the expense of other considerations. But the shareholder value 
movement also brought with it a series of changes that have undone 
many core features of the Berle and Means corporation. Corporate own-
ership is no longer dispersed;2 the concentration of assets and employ-
ment have been in decline for three decades;3 and today’s largest corpo-
rations bear little resemblance to the companies analyzed by Berle and 
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Means.4 Moreover, there are far fewer of them than there used to be: the 
United States had half as many publicly traded domestic corporations in 
2009 as it did in 1997.5 In another generation, the Berle and Means cor-
poration may be just a memory, overtaken by new forms of organization 
and financing. 
In this Article, I draw on a series of recent studies and empirical ob-
servations to describe the rise and fall of the Berle and Means corpora-
tion. Part I describes the four major features of the American corporate 
system as presented by Berle and Means and how this view came to do-
minate thinking about the corporation among social scientists. Part II 
lays out the theoretical challenges to this view that underlay the share-
holder value movement and the changes wrought by the 1980s bust-up 
takeover wave. In Part III, I describe how each of the four features of the 
Berle and Means corporation has been undone over the past two decades, 
concluding that the corporation no longer fits its description as a social 
institution. It has instead come to resemble the “nexus of contracts” pro-
posed by Berle and Means’s critics in economics. Part IV closes with 
speculation about the possibilities for fruitful collaboration between law-
yers and social scientists as we contemplate what comes next. 
I. THE CORPORATION AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 1932–1982 
Berle and Means opened The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property with an analysis of the public corporation that proved to be re-
markably enduring. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, the 
United States had evolved a new form of economic order analogous to 
the feudal system that preceded competitive capitalism. The key to this 
new economic order was the modern corporation, an encompassing so-
cial form that rivaled the state in its far-reaching powers. According to 
Berle and Means: 
The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a 
giant corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a 
multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of 
trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The 
organizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm 
of private enterprise—they have become more nearly social institu-
tions.6 
                                                 
 4. The petroleum sector is one notable exception in that the dominant oil companies analyzed 
by Berle and Means—primarily the many “progeny” of the original Standard Oil Company—
maintain their dominance today. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 4. 
 5. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2010), available at http://data. 
worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2010. 
 6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 46. 
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Four premises stand out from the analysis that opens The Modern 
Corporation. First, “[e]conomic power, in terms of control over physical 
assets, is apparently responding to a centripetal force, tending more and 
more to concentrate in the hands of a few corporate managements.”7 The 
third chapter of The Modern Corporation documents this centripetal ten-
dency. Through mergers and organic growth, assets and employment had 
become increasingly concentrated among a relative handful of corpora-
tions. By 1930, the 200 largest corporations controlled 49.2% of corpo-
rate wealth,8 and if the trends observed by Berle and Means had contin-
ued, they would have controlled it all by 1959.9 
Second, “beneficial ownership is centrifugal, tending to divide and 
subdivide, to split into ever smaller units and to pass freely from hand to 
hand.”10 During the decade after the end of the First World War, retail 
investment in stocks and bonds grew dramatically, and the number of 
shareholders doubled from 2.4 million in 1924 to 5 million in 1927, 
doubling again to 10 million in 1930.11 Chapter 4 of the book describes 
the broad dispersion of stock ownership among the public, while Chap-
ter 5 shows the consequences for the corporation: 44% of the largest 200 
corporations were under effective management control, with no single 
entity holding more than 5% of the voting stock.12 
Third, large corporations typically make physical products, trans-
port them, or provide infrastructure. The 200 large corporations analyzed 
by Berle and Means included 106 industrials, 52 utilities, and 42 rai-
lroads, nearly all entailing large-scale physical operations.13 “The factory 
system, the basis of the industrial revolution, brought an increasingly 
large number of workers directly under a single management.”14 It was 
the grand scale of contemporary methods of production that required is-
suing shares to the public in the first place, because few families had the 
wherewithal to fund them. When Ford’s famous Rouge Plant began turn-
ing out Model A cars in 1927, for instance, it employed 75,000 workers 
and grew from there to well over 100,000.15 The large size of the modern 
                                                 
 7. Id. at 9. 
 8. Id. at 32. 
 9. Id. at 40–41. 
 10. Id. at 9. 
 11. EDWIN BURK COX, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK OWNERSHIP 33 (1963). 
 12. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 93–94. 
 13. Id. at 20–27. 
 14. Id. at 3. 
 15. Vivian Baulch & Patricia Zacharias, The Rouge Plant—The Art of Industry, DETROIT 
NEWS (July 11, 1997), http://apps.detnews.com/apps/history/index.php?id=189. Ford, however, was 
the exception to the rule of public ownership, as the company was privately held at the time Berle 
and Means wrote, and remained so until its initial public offering in 1956. 
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corporation matched the large scale of tangible activities that it per-
formed. 
Fourth, corporations are long-lasting relative to the individuals 
whose destinies they control. “Bankruptcy” and “liquidation” do not ap-
pear in the index of Berle and Means’s 1932 edition and play little con-
ceptual role in the text, in spite of the fact that it was written during the 
Great Depression. Rather, like states, corporations were expected to be 
enduring features of the societal landscape. Berle and Means opined that 
if trends continued, corporations might come to rival states as “the domi-
nant institution of the modern world.”16 They were “economic empires” 
that were in “the hands of a new form of absolutism, relegating ‘owners’ 
to the position of those who supply the means whereby the new princes 
may exercise their power.”17 This analogy with feudalism was a recur-
ring motif in the book. 
The book closes with a speculative vision of how the nascent cor-
porate system might evolve to take on features of a new and benevolent 
feudalism: 
Should the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a program com-
prising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their 
public, and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a 
portion of the profits from the owners of passive property, and 
should the community generally accept such a scheme as a logical 
and human solution of industrial difficulties, the interests of passive 
property owners would have to give way. Courts would almost of 
necessity be forced to recognize the result, justifying it by whatever 
of the many legal theories they might choose.18 
In short, the “paramount interests of the community” would trump those 
of both shareholders and managers.19 
By the 1950s, Berle and Means’s vision of a society dominated by 
management-controlled large corporations was ensconced in social 
science and in the popular imagination. Management theorist Peter 
Drucker, who had studied General Motors under Alfred P. Sloan, wrote 
in Harper’s Magazine that in the contemporary American economy, 
“[t]he representative, the decisive, industrial unit is the large, mass-
                                                 
 16. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 356. 
 17. Id. at 124. 
 18. Id. at 356. 
 19. Id. Compare Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a 
corporation . . . are necessarily . . . exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as 
their interest appears”), with ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 
169 (1954) (conceding twenty years later that the shareholder primacy view had, in practice, been 
decisively defeated by the community-centered view). 
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production plant, managed by professionals without ownership-stake, 
employing thousands of people, and organized on entirely different tech-
nological, social, and economic principles” than traditional businesses 
controlled by their owners. He described the large corporation as a syn-
ecdoche for American society: “The big enterprise is the true symbol of 
our social order . . . . In the industrial enterprise the structure which ac-
tually underlies all our society can be seen . . . .”20 The ways of the ma-
nagerialist mass-production corporation had become the operating sys-
tem of American society, from the farm to the school to the government 
itself. 
Economist Carl Kaysen claimed that the professional managers 
who ran America’s major corporations had evolved into a caste of bene-
volent elites who took seriously the corporation’s responsibility to the 
paramount interests of the community: 
No longer the agent of proprietorship seeking to maximize return on 
investment, management sees itself as responsible to stockholders, 
employees, customers, the general public, and, perhaps most impor-
tant, the firm itself as an institution. . . . [Moreover, its] responsibili-
ties to the general public are widespread: leadership in local charit-
able enterprises, concern with factory architecture and landscaping, 
provision of support for higher education, and even research in pure 
science, to name a few.21 
Ralf Dahrendorf, a sociologist, argued that the separation of owner-
ship and control identified by Berle and Means marked a sharp break 
with prior forms of economic organization, and stated that there was “an 
astonishing degree of consensus among sociologists on the implications 
of joint-stock companies for the structure of industrial enterprises, and 
for the wider structure of society.”22 America was no longer, strictly 
speaking, a capitalist economy, but rather a new kind of industrial econ-
omy, and those in charge of business followed organizational imperatives 
other than profit maximization. Professional managers were distinctly 
different from traditional business owners in their outlook and motiva-
tion: “Among classical capitalists, the ‘organization man’ is an unthinka-
ble absurdity. . . . Never has the imputation of a profit motive been fur-
ther from the real motives of men than it is for modern bureaucratic 
managers.”23 And C. Wright Mills, another sociologist, while disagreeing 
                                                 
 20. Peter F. Drucker, The New Society: I. Revolution by Mass Production, HARPER’S MAG., 
Sept. 1949, at 29. 
 21. Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 
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with Kaysen’s sanguine view of public-spirited corporate elites, nonethe-
less took for granted the view that management had been largely freed 
from the demands of finance: “Not ‘Wall Street financiers’ or bankers, 
but large owners and executives in their self-financing corporations hold 
the keys of economic power.”24 
For a generation after the writings of these mid-century theorists, 
corporations continued to grow larger and more encompassing. The di-
versifying merger movement of the 1960s added a new form of mega-
corporation to the group identified by Berle and Means. Conglomerates 
such as ITT, LTV, Gulf & Western, and Litton Industries grew vast 
through strings of acquisitions across dozens of industries, joining tradi-
tional blue chips like AT&T and General Motors. ITT grew from 
132,000 employees in 1960 to 392,000 in 1970, adding Sheraton Hotels, 
Hartford Insurance, Continental Baking, Avis Rent-a-Car, and dozens of 
other businesses to its portfolio.25 During the same period, GM added 
100,000 workers and AT&T added almost 200,000.26 Moreover, this 
growth in the size of the largest corporations corresponded to a period of 
great economic prosperity and declining income inequality. The Gini 
index of income inequality dropped to its lowest level on record in the 
United States in 1968, just as corporate employment concentration 
reached its apex.27 
Berle and Means’s prophecy about the ever-increasing concentra-
tion of corporate control seemed to have come true. Policymakers re-
sponded by drafting the large corporation into service as a tool for ad-
dressing social ills on a grand scale. If a few dozen giant corporations 
controlled the bulk of the economy, then efforts at social and economic 
reform could get the most leverage by targeting these firms. Thus, during 
the years of the Nixon Administration, corporations became a central 
mechanism to realize policy goals around environmental protection (the 
creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970), workplace 
safety (the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970), 
product safety (the passage of the Consumer Product Safety Act of 
1972), and equitable employment practices (the passage of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, giving the EEOC litigation au-
thority). Corporate concentration may have been bad for competition, but 
it certainly made the job of would-be social engineers a lot easier. 
                                                 
 24. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 125 (1956). 
 25. Gerald F. Davis & J. Adam Cobb, Corporations and Economic Inequality Around the 
World: The Paradox of Hierarchy, 30 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 35, 35–53 (2010). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 47. 
2011] Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation 1127 
II. THE DOMINANCE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 1982–2001 
But as the corporation-as-institution was reaching its apex in reali-
ty, it was being undermined in theory. In 1965, Henry Manne argued that 
those who accepted the premise of managerial hegemony, following 
Berle and Means, may have been too hasty. There was a limit to how 
much corporate managers could abuse their investors on behalf of them-
selves or other constituencies. That limit was enforced by a previously 
unrecognized “market for corporate control”: poorly managed companies 
suffered low valuations on the stock market, attracting entrepreneurs who 
could buy control of the company on the market, fire the laggards in 
charge, and renovate the firm for a quick profit. Only an outmoded ap-
proach to antitrust prevented this from happening on a large scale.28 
Others decried the view of the corporation as a social institution as 
delusional. Corporations had neither power nor obligations with respect 
to their members, who were all voluntary participants. Armen Alchian 
and Harold Demsetz, for example, asked: 
What then is the content of the presumed power to manage and as-
sign workers to various tasks? Exactly the same as one little con-
sumer’s power to manage and assign his grocer to various tasks. . . . 
I have no contract to continue to purchase from the grocer and nei-
ther the employer nor the employee is bound by any contractual ob-
ligations to continue their relationship.29 
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling combined these ideas 
into a comprehensive critique of the Berle and Means view of the corpo-
ration. First, it simply didn’t make sense that investors would put their 
savings into shares of companies run by unaccountable managers. There 
must be forces to compel management’s attention to share price, or else 
their company would fail or be taken over as investors shunned their se-
curities and the company’s share price declined. Financial markets, far 
from being irrelevant, provided a minute-by-minute report card on ma-
nagerial quality, and there were a host of mechanisms that gave man-
agement incentives to care what the financial markets thought. Second, 
the view of the corporation as a social institution that might rival the 
state was simply wrong: the corporation was nothing more than a “nexus 
of contracts” among voluntary, individual participants. As Jensen and 
Meckling explained: 
                                                 
 28. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POLIT. ECON. 110 
(1965). 
 29. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972). 
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[M]ost organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nex-
us for a set of contracting relationships among individu-
als. . . . Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distin-
guish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any other organiza-
tion) from those things that are “outside” of it. There is in a very 
real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) 
between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, materi-
al and capital inputs and the consumers of output.30 
When it came to the corporation, there was no “there” there. This 
view was provocative, contrary to conventional wisdom, and, ultimately, 
highly influential. 
During the Reagan Administration, the theoretical dream of Manne 
and his heirs came true, as financial markets became the North Star guid-
ing corporate decision-making. Three policy changes around 1982 were 
particularly consequential for precipitating the “shareholder value” 
movement. First, the Department of Justice released a set of merger 
guidelines that substantially eased limitations on within-industry mer-
gers. Second, the Supreme Court’s Edgar v. MITE decision31 struck 
down a set of state laws limiting hostile takeovers of domestic corpora-
tions under the Commerce Clause. Third, based on an IRS ruling in 
1981, corporations began to offer 401(k) plans to their employees as a 
supplement and, eventually, a replacement for traditional defined-benefit 
pension plans. 
The first two of these changes helped unleash a wave of hostile ta-
keovers aimed largely at the conglomerates built up during the 1960s and 
1970s. Diversified firms were systematically undervalued on the stock 
market relative to focused firms in the same industries, a regularity that 
was dubbed the “conglomerate discount.” The loss of state-level takeover 
protection made firms vulnerable to outside tender offers, and the revised 
merger guidelines meant that the parts of conglomerates could more rea-
dily be sold to buyers in related industries. In combination with the new 
availability of large-scale bridge financing through “junk bonds” and 
other means, this created the perfect context for raiders to buy conglome-
rates, bust them up, and sell the parts for a profit, which is precisely what 
happened. During the 1980s, 29% of the Fortune 500 largest industrials 
received tender offers, and one in three were ultimately acquired or 
merged.32 This was the largest industrial reorganization in the United 
                                                 
 30. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309–10 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 31. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 32. Gerald F. Davis & Suzanne K. Stout, Organization Theory and the Market for Corporate 
Control: A Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover Targets, 1980–1990, 37 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 605, 605 (1992). 
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States since the merger wave at the turn of the twentieth century, which 
had created the large corporation as we know it. Of the firms that re-
mained, dozens voluntarily restructured through spin-offs and other 
means, and broad, unrelated acquisitions nearly disappeared as a growth 
tactic.33 After a decade of mergers, the largest firms actually ended up 
smaller than they were at the start, reducing aggregate corporate concen-
tration in the economy.34 As we will see below, the trend in disaggrega-
tion continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s as innovative new means 
for outsourcing arose in nearly every sector. 
The third change—the advent of the 401(k)—had complementary 
effects in reinforcing the power of financial markets relative to corpora-
tions. First, it helped create a broad new constituency for “shareholder 
value,” as an increasingly large part of the population became invested in 
the stock market. The proportion of households with money invested in 
the market increased from just over 20% in 1983 to more than 50% by 
2001.35 It also channeled the vast new pools of capital created through 
employee savings through mutual funds, which grew from $135 billion 
in assets under management in 1980 to $7 trillion in 2000.36 Broad popu-
lar participation in the stock market, coupled with a relatively concen-
trated set of institutional investors, thus created a strong counterweight to 
“imperial” corporate managers. 
By the late 1990s, there was wide agreement among corporate man-
agers, directors, shareholders, and many scholars that the corporation 
existed to create shareholder value.37 This triumph of the shareholders 
was not inevitable. Michael Jensen, perhaps the strongest academic voice 
for shareholder primacy, proclaimed the “eclipse of the public corpora-
tion” in a 1989 article in Harvard Business Review.38 He argued that the 
fundamental conflict between those who own the public corporation and 
those who manage it could not ultimately be resolved, that professional 
managers were deviously clever in finding ways to avoid the discipline 
of outside markets (by adopting poison pills, for example), and that al-
ternative forms of business organization (such as leveraged buyout part-
                                                 
 33. Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The 
Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 547, 547 (1995). 
 34. See White, supra note 3. 
 35. Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence From the 2001 
and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., at A1 (2006), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf. 
 36. 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK (2010), available at http://www.icifactbook.org/. 
 37. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 441 (2001). 
 38. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989, 
available at http://hbr.org/1989/09/eclipse-of-the-public-corporation/ar/1. 
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nerships) offered an attractive solution to the problems created by the 
separation of ownership and control.39 
During the subsequent decade, however, upwards of 3,000 corpora-
tions went public in the United States, in industries such as biotechnolo-
gy, computers, energy, and business services. By 1997, the United States 
had 8,851 publicly traded corporations—an increase of more than one-
third compared to 1990, and the highest level on record.40 Moreover, the 
managers of these corporations evidently had no illusions about the pur-
poses of their firms: they existed to create shareholder value, not to cater 
to various alleged “stakeholders.” Consider the mission statements of 
two Fortune 100 corporations in the late 1990s. According to the Coca-
Cola Company, “We exist to create value for our share owners on a long-
term basis by building a business that enhances The Coca-Cola Compa-
ny’s trademarks.”41 Sara Lee Corporation took a similar view: “[Our] 
mission is to build leadership brands in consumer packaged goods mar-
kets around the world. Our primary purpose is to create long-term stock-
holder value.”42 Any broader conception of corporate purpose seemed to 
have been vanquished. 
III. THE TWILIGHT OF THE PUBLIC CORPORATION IN THE EARLY 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
A decade into the twenty-first century, the core premises of the 
Berle and Means corporation have given way to a rather different situa-
tion, due in large part to the success of the shareholder value movement. 
I will consider each premise in turn. 
The first premise, that corporate ownership is centrifugal, has been 
undermined by the unprecedented growth of a handful of mutual funds in 
the United States. Due to the vast increase in retail and 401(k) invest-
ment, mutual funds’ net assets were almost 100 times larger in 2007 ($12 
trillion) than they were in 1980 ($135 billion), and the number of share-
holder accounts increased from 12 million to over 290 million.43 Moreo-
ver, the bulk of this growth went to a handful of well-known mutual 
funds; the share of assets held by the top five fund complexes in 2009, at 
39%, was about the same as it had been in 1985.44 Thus, name-brand 
fund families—in particular Fidelity, Vanguard, and the American 
                                                 
 39. Id. 
 40. WORLD BANK, supra note 5. 
 41. GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RE-SHAPED AMERICA 86 
(2009). 
 42. Id. 
 43. 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 36. 
 44. Id. at fig.2.2. 
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Funds—grew to become the largest shareholders in corporate America 
during the 1980s and 1990s. For actively managed funds such as Fidelity 
and the American Funds, this meant that their holdings in particular port-
folio companies were often highly concentrated. By the late 1990s, Fidel-
ity was the largest single shareholder of one in ten United States corpora-
tions, often holding blocks of 10%–15% or more, even among competi-
tors in the same industry.45 It appears that corporate ownership in the 
United States has become more concentrated than at any point since the 
heyday of J.P. Morgan in the early twentieth century.46 Ironically, this 
renewed concentration is due to the growth of retail investment, which 
had led to the dispersion of corporate ownership in the 1920s. 
The second premise is that corporate control is centripetal, and that 
corporations tend to increase the assets and employees under their con-
trol, leading to increasing concentration over time. As previously dis-
cussed, corporate concentration began to decline during the 1980s takeo-
ver wave, and this trend continued through the 1990s and 2000s. In 1960, 
the twenty-five largest firms in the United States employed the equiva-
lent of 6.1% of the private labor force; in 1970, it had risen to 9.3%; in 
1980, it was 7.3%; in 1990, it had dropped to 5.8%; and by 2000, it de-
clined to 4.0%—less than half of the equivalent figure thirty years 
prior.47 
Standing behind these declines in corporate concentration are sub-
stantial changes in the organization of production in the United States 
economy. These changes might be summarized as “Nikefication.” Nike 
is well-known for its modular model of producing shoes and athletic 
gear: while the company engages in the design and marketing of its 
goods, manufacturing is almost entirely done by overseas contractors, 
primarily in East Asia. The theory behind this model is that high value-
added activities (the knowledge-based work of design and marketing) 
should be done by the company that owns the brand, while lower value-
added activities, such as assembly and supply chain management, can be 
contracted out. Although the Nike model has a long history in apparel, 
thanks to Wall Street pressures and the availability of an outsourcing sec-
tor, the model spread widely throughout the electronics industry and is 
now standard practice in industries from consumer packaged goods to 
pharmaceuticals. The articulation of a large sector of generic manufac-
                                                 
 45. Davis, supra note 2, at 12. 
 46. Cf. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
(1914). 
 47. Davis & Cobb, supra note 25; see also White, supra note 3 (documenting similar declines 
in asset concentration). 
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turers (known in electronics as “board stuffers”), often operating over-
seas, allows even the smallest company to produce on a large scale. 
One result of this movement is that a company can be large in reve-
nues and market capitalization while remaining quite small in employ-
ment and assets. According to its 10-K for 2010, Nike is “the largest sel-
ler of athletic footwear and athletic apparel in the world” with over $19 
billion in revenues, a market capitalization of $42 billion, and 700 retail 
outlets. Yet it employs only 34,400 people globally.48 
Although the prevalence of Nikefication is hard to quantify—the 
model does not leave obvious traces in public records—a handful of ex-
amples will illustrate its implications. The company with the largest U.S. 
market share for LCD televisions in 2010 was not Sony or Samsung, but 
Vizio, based in Irvine, California. Vizio’s CEO built the firm earlier in 
the decade by recognizing that the parts and know-how to build televi-
sions were readily available on the market—like the components of a 
PC—and that the critical element was a distribution channel, which he 
duly negotiated with Costco and other big-box stores. The televisions are 
assembled by a Taiwanese firm with an ownership stake in privately held 
Vizio, and they generally retail at a much lower cost than those produced 
by Vizio’s name-brand competitors. By 2010, the company had several 
billion dollars in revenues, plans to roll out a tablet computer and a smart 
phone,49 and fewer than 200 employees.50 
In pet food, over 100 brands, from Science Diet to the Walmart 
store brand, are manufactured by Menu Foods of Ontario in a single fac-
tory, a fact that was revealed in 2007 when much of the nation’s pet 
chow turned out to be tainted with melamine from its Chinese suppli-
ers.51 In pharmaceuticals, the widely used blood thinner heparin, sold by 
Baxter International, was recalled in 2008 when it was attributed with the 
deaths of at least eighty-one patients and injuries of several hundred 
more. It had been produced under contract in a Chinese factory that re-
lied on mom-and-pop suppliers for its critical ingredient, pig intestines.52 
And in corporate law, companies that choose to incorporate in Liberia 
(such as Miami-based Royal Caribbean Cruises and several other ship-
ping companies) find that Liberian incorporation is handled by an off-
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shore vendor located in Vienna, Virginia, near Dulles Airport.53 The 
American corporation, in short, increasingly resembles the nexus-of-
contracts described by the financial economists. 
Berle and Means’s third premise is that the typical corporation 
makes or transports tangible products. But the previous examples hint 
that this is no longer the case, and more systematic data provide further 
evidence against it. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
manufacturing employment in the United States declined by one-third, 
and by March 2009, more Americans were unemployed than were em-
ployed in manufacturing.54 This shift is reflected in the character of the 
largest employers. In 1960, the five largest private employers in the 
United States consisted of AT&T and four vertically integrated manufac-
turers—GM, Ford, GE, and U.S. Steel. In 1980, U.S. Steel had been re-
placed in the top five by Sears. By 2010, however, nine of the twelve 
largest employers were retailers, and none were manufacturers. Indeed, 
Walmart alone employed as many Americans as the twenty largest man-
ufacturers combined.55 
Whereas large manufacturers characteristically have relatively low 
turnover, long employee tenures (eight years on average in auto manu-
facturing), and high wages (over $27 per hour for auto workers), retailers 
have high turnover (an estimated 40% annually at Walmart), low tenure 
(three years on average), and low wages ($9.33 per hour in “general mer-
chandise retailing”).56 Retail also has characteristically different forms of 
work organization. Where Ford’s Rouge Plant employed over 100,000 
people at its peak, a typical Walmart Supercenter employs roughly 350 
people in a highly modular format. Thus, with Nikefication has come a 
substantial shift in the nature of the largest corporate employers; the fac-
tory system that precipitated the modern large corporation had become 
marginal to employment in the United States. 
The final premise is that corporations are relatively long-lived. This 
premise was not explicit, but the image of corporations as analogous to 
feudal manors makes little sense in a world of high corporate turnover. 
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Berle and Means’s prediction that a handful of identifiable corporations 
would come to dominate the American economy was not a bad guess. 
The half-century after they wrote The Modern Corporation was distin-
guished by remarkable stability at the core of the corporate economy 
compared with what had come before. For instance, of the thirty firms 
included in the Dow Jones Industrial Index in 1930, sixteen of them were 
still there in 1987, almost six decades later.57 Yet by 2009, all but three—
Chevron, Exxon, and GE—were gone due to bankruptcies, mergers, or 
radical reorganizations, such as Woolworth’s rebranding as Foot Locker 
or Westinghouse’s transformation into CBS. Recent exits from the index 
include GM, AIG, and Citigroup, all of which had inadvertently become 
government-supported enterprises due to the financial crisis. 
Thanks to Nikefication, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
which corporations are still with us and which have moved on to their 
great reward. Circuit City, for instance, was a large national retailer with 
over 34,000 employees and stores across the United States when it fell 
into liquidation in early 2009 and its employees were all fired.58 Yet the 
familiar logo and brand name live on at www.CircuitCity.com, a website 
now operated by Systemax, a Long Island-based direct marketer that 
purchased the Circuit City brand and domain name for $14 million at a 
bankruptcy auction. Similar fates befell other retailers, such as Linens ’n 
Things and CompUSA, indicating that retail may be no safe haven for 
stable employment in an era of automated web-based order fulfillment. 
Perhaps the most compelling challenge to the view of the United 
States as a corporate-centered society is the sheer decline in the number 
of public corporations. As Figure 1 shows, the number of public corpora-
tions in the United States in 2009 was half what it had been in 1997. This 
number had declined by over 21% just between 2008 and 2009. The “ec-
lipse of the public corporation” prophesied by Michael Jensen in 1989 
finally seems to have come true, although perhaps not for the reasons he 
predicted. 
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Cross-national comparisons suggest that this is not a global conse-
quence of the economic downturn. India actually surpassed the United 
States in its number of public corporations in 2009, and China also main-
tained a large set of public corporations. Germany, on the other hand, 
was down to roughly 600 public corporations—fewer than Pakistan—
despite its relatively healthy economy.60 
In just over a generation, the shareholder value movement had laid 
to rest the familiar corporation described by Berle and Means. In recent 
years, corporations have grown less numerous, less integrated, less con-
centrated, more ephemeral, and more constrained by their shareholders. 
One consequence of corporate disaggregation is that corporations 
cannot fulfill public policy goals as effectively as they could during the 
Nixon Administration, when a mere twenty-five firms employed nearly 
10% of the workforce. Consider the top economic priority of the Obama 
Administration, which is to create more jobs and reduce unemployment. 
The widely shared folk wisdom is that the path to greater employment 
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runs through entrepreneurship. The day after Obama’s State of the Union 
address in 2010, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed by the pub-
lisher of Forbes that stated the case plainly, drawing on the experience of 
Steve Jobs and Apple, which had just released its iPad. “Mr. Obama and 
his advisors need to grasp this essential fact: Entrepreneurs are not just a 
cute little subsector of the American economy. They are the whole game. 
They will give us tomorrow’s Apples and the multiplier effect of small 
businesses and exciting new jobs that go with them.”61 
Yet the very next issue included an article entitled Analysts expect 
iPad to give lift to Asian suppliers,62 which contained this statement: 
“Like many technology brands, Apple doesn’t actually manufacture most 
of its products. It hires manufacturing specialists—mainly Taiwanese 
companies that have extensive operations in China—to assemble its gad-
gets based on Apple’s designs.”63 The article specifically mentions Hon 
Hai Precision Industry of Taiwan as the assembler of choice.64 A few 
weeks later, Hon Hai lost its previous anonymity when a string of sui-
cides by its workers in Shenzen, China, revealed just how exciting the 
jobs created by Apple actually were.65 
With just over 34,000 employees around the world, Apple creates 
relatively few jobs in the United States with its innovative products be-
cause it follows the Nike model of production. And Apple is not alone in 
this regard; the brain trust of corporate innovation in the United States 
has created a great deal of shareholder value, but not that many jobs. 
Collectively, Apple (with 34,300 employees), Google (19,835), Intel 
(79,800), Amazon.com (24,300), Cisco (65,550), and Microsoft (93,000) 
employed only 316,785 workers, of which 215,485 were employed in the 
United States in 2010. For comparison purposes, grocery chain Kroger 
had 334,000 workers in the United States. Somewhat more pointedly, the 
United States lost 598,000 net jobs in January 2009 alone—the equiva-
lent of 17.43 Apples.66 
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The implication of this discussion is that contemporary corporations 
provide limited capacity for implementing public policy. Judging from 
the employment practices of the most successful technology companies 
of the past quarter-century, there is little reason to expect that policies 
favoring corporate innovation will lead to a flood of new jobs—whatever 
their contribution to shareholder value. 
IV. WHAT COMES NEXT? 
The history of the American corporation shows that there are criti-
cal unsettled periods when policy choices set a direction with long-
lasting implications. Public corporations were of relatively modest signi-
ficance in the United States before the turn of the twentieth century. 
Nearly all were railroads or utilities; fewer than a dozen manufacturers 
listed their shares in 1890, and the largest manufacturer, Carnegie Steel, 
was a private partnership. Yet by 1905, thanks to a merger wave engi-
neered by Wall Street that consolidated regional firms into national oli-
gopolies in nearly every major industry, the familiar large-scale modern 
corporation was born. As William Roy shows, this outcome was far from 
inevitable in the United States,67 and the experience of the rest of the 
world showed the viability of functional alternatives, such as industrial 
districts.68 Moreover, a number of non-corporate alternatives arose to 
challenge the dominance of the public corporation, including mutuals, 
co-ops, and municipally owned firms.69 
During the 1930s, the fraught relation between financial institutions 
and firms was set on a different course due to the Glass-Steagall Act, 
which ratified a strong boundary between finance and industry and 
created a free-standing constituency for financial markets in the form of 
the investment banking industry. Although Glass-Steagall was not the 
first time that policy intervened to keep American financial institutions 
weak,70 it was perhaps the most consequential. Yet Glass-Steagall was a 
choice, not an inevitability. 
And as I have argued, policy decisions early in the Reagan years 
simultaneously created the conditions for the hostile takeover wave that 
unraveled the old corporate order and set in motion the shareholder value 
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movement that replaced it. In retrospect, it is clear that 1982 was a turn-
ing point, but it could have been otherwise. 
The United States now faces a similar critical period. Half of its 
public corporations have disappeared through multiple rounds of bub-
bles, scandals, and corporate failures. The first ten years of the twenty-
first century represented the single worst period of stock market perfor-
mance in U.S. history. The S&P 500 closed the first trading day of 2000 
at $1,455.22. On January 1, 2010, it stood at $1,115.10, having declined 
by almost one-quarter over the decade.71 A generation that had hoped to 
retire on increased home values and an ever-rising stock market would 
require other plans. Not only is an economy organized around public 
corporations an increasingly risky place for workers, it is not a safe bet 
even for shareholders. 
With the ready availability of the organizational technology for dis-
aggregated production (as used by Apple, Nike, and Vizio), alternative 
means of large-scale financing (such as private equity), and a prolifera-
tion of alternative legal forms (such as LLCs and B Corporations), it is 
possible that we are reaching the twilight of the public corporation as the 
dominant form of business in the United States. Once again, what comes 
next is not foreordained. There is an opening for fruitful collaboration 
between social scientists and lawyers in their role as “transaction cost 
engineers” to help encourage new formats that better meet the needs of 
society, which have been left wanting since the collapse of the old corpo-
rate order. As this Article has suggested, the rise and intellectual domin-
ance of the shareholder value concept of the corporation owed a great 
deal to the advent of the law and economics movement that connected 
lawyers and economists. Perhaps a similar movement could better con-
nect lawyers with scholars of sociology and organizations of the sort 
convened by the Berle Symposium. The Berle and Means corporation 
served us well for many decades, until the shareholder value movement 
ultimately killed it off. It is time to contemplate what comes after its fit-
ful disappearance. 
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